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I
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal by Joseph Billings (plaintiff and appellant) from the final
judgment of the District Court of Utah, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake, County (Case No.
090907164) entered for defendants and respondents Paul James Toscano and Paul Toscano,
P.C. The judgment disposed all of the claims alleged in this action on a motion for
summary judgment filed by respondents. The clerk of the Third District Court filed the
order granting summary judgment on October 27, 2009.

II
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY AND APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from the foregoing judgment, which finally disposes all of the
issues between the parties. Notice of Appeal was filed timely on November 23, 2009. [CT,
Vol. II, 403]. The court of appeals notified the parties that a final order had not been
prepared according to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (f) (2) and entered by the clerk of
the court. Respondents (the prevailing parties) thereafter submitted a proposed final order
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (f) (2) on February 18, 2010. The district court
entered final judgment on February 24, 2010. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah State Rules of Court 3 and 42.
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Ill
ISSUES RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT AND PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Adjudication of Count One of
the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process Because Appellant Controverted
Respondents' Assertion of Prior Settlement of the Claim and Established
Disputed Material Facts and Genuine Issues in Support of the Cause of Action.
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol. II, 246] [CT, Vol. II, 209-224]
[CT, Vol. II, 225] [CT, Vol. II, 234] [CT, Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol. II, 225; CT,
Vol. II, 234]
The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's
Estate Did Not Bar Count One of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of
Process or Any Other Cause of Action Contained in First Amended Complaint
Because Respondents Failed to Assert and Explicitly Waived the Affirmative
Defenses of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel in the Trial Court.
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol I, 209] [RT, 8, Lines 5-11] [CT,
Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol. II, 225; CT, Vol. II, 234]
The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's
Estate Did Not In Any Case Satisfy the Requirements of Res Judicata or
Collateral Estoppel And Even if Respondents had not Waived these
Affirmative Defenses, the Trial Court Should Have Denied Summary
Judgment on the Basis of Appellant's Affidavits
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [RT, 8, Lines 5-11] [CT, Vol. II, 398-402
(order after ruling)] [RT, 8, Lines 5-11] [CT, Vol. II, 398-402 (ruling after hearing)]
[CT, Vol. II, 398-402 (ruling after hearing)] [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed
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Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy
Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules] [CT, Vol. II, 366
(Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the
United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]
4.

Respondents Failed to File a Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of
Summary Adjudication of Counts Two and Three of the First Cause of Action
for Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third
Cause of Action for Negligence Contained in the First Amended Complaint.
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol. II, 303] [CT, Vol. II 347, 349, n.2]
[CT, Vol. II, 246-261] [CT, Vol. II, 303-346] [CT, Vol. II, 246; Vol. II, 303-346]

5.

The Trial Court Should Have Denied Respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgment of the First Amended Complaint Because Appellant Filed Sufficient
Affidavits to Establish a Genuine Factual Dispute Concerning Claims that
Toscano Asserted a Settlement Agreement Obtained by Fraud in Support of
Summary Judgment.
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol. II, 366]
Review of the trial court order granting summary judgment is de novo. Simms v.

Oklahoma 165F.3dl32h 1326 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 815, 120 S.Ct. 53
(1999). The appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from them
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (plaintiff and appellant). Higgins v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). The applicability of the affirmative
defenses oi res judicata or collateral estoppel is a question of law, which appellate courts
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also consider de novo. Proctor Gamble Corporation v. Amway Corporation 376 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 2004).
IV
APPLICALBE RULES OF COURT ON APPEAL

1.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (c) (3) (A):

A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue
exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in
the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment unless controverted by the responding party. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure Section 7 (c) (3) (A).

2.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56:

(a)

For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-

claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment
by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.

(b)

For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-

claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.

(c)

Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits

shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue
as to the amount of damages.

(d)

Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment

is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.

(e)

Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
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(f)

When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a

party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

(g)

Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to

this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

V
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Procedural History
Appellant filed a complaint in the district court on April 30, 2009 containing a

single cause of action for abuse of process against appellees Paul James Toscano and Paul
Toscano P.C. The complaint alleged that appellees had filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in behalf of a petitioner whom appellees
knew did not qualify for relief under Chapter 7. The complaint further alleged that
respondents did not file the petition for legitimate debt relief, but rather filed the petition
solely for the ulterior purpose of circumventing a lawsuit pending in California Superior
Court against the debtor for fraud and quiet title to real property. The complaint also
alleged that respondents intentionally abused Chapter 7 within the meanings of 11 U.S.C.
Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1); 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I), and 11 U.S.C. Section
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707 (b) (3) and that respondents therefore also violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 9011 [CT, Vol.1, 2].
Respondent Toscano deployed various efforts to evade and deny personal service of
the complaint. Ultimately, respondents filed a motion on May 8, 2009 to dismiss the action
alleging that the Utah District Court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction [CT,
Vol. I, 11]. Appellant filed an Affidavit of Process Server on June 1, 2009 [CT, Vol. I, 99101] and opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss on June 9, 2009 [CT, Vol. I, 102].1
On August 21, 2009 respondents filed a motion for expedited summary judgment
[CT, Vol. I, 136]. Respondents served notice of an expedited hearing set for September 1,
2009 by e-mail on August 22, 2009 [CT, Vol. I, 136]. Appellant quickly filed opposition
to the motion for summary judgment on August 27, 2009, which incorporated a
memorandum of points and authorities, a statement controverting respondents' statement of
undisputed facts, and a statement of disputed facts and genuine issues [CT, Vol. II, 209224]. On August 31, 2009 appellant filed a separate Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Opposition to respondent's motion [CT, Vol. II, 225] and a
Separate Statement of Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues [CT, Vol. II, 234].
On August 31, 2009 appellant also filed and served a First Amended Complaint
alleging three causes of action: (1) Abuse of Process (three separate and distinct counts); (2)
Fraud, and (3) Negligence. Count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process

1

Respondent Toscano employs signature sharp practices. He appeared in this action
essentially pro per through his law partner and did not serve the motion to dismiss for
alleged lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction until almost a month after filing it.
Respondents have never filed an answer to the complaint.
13

re-alleged the single cause of action contained in the original complaint against
respondents for intentionally abusing Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in
2008. But counts two and three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the
Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for Negligence
contained in the First Amended Complaint alleged entirely new claims against respondents,
which arose from conduct committed by respondents on April 15, 2009 and after appellant
filed the original complaint on April 30, 2009. The two new and distinct counts of abuse of
process and the additional claims for fraud and negligence had separate and different
factual bases than the original complaint, which contained only a single cause of action
against respondents for intentionally abusing Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code in 2008 [CT, Vol. II, 246]. The district court nevertheless convened a hearing on
September 1, 2009 on respondents' expedited motion for summary judgment of the
original complaint. At the time of the expedited hearing (September 1, 2009), respondents
had not yet had an opportunity (due to their own procedural strategies) to file a response to
the First Amended Complaint (filed August 31, 2009). The court took the matter under
submission after oral argument.
On September 17, 2009, in response to appellant's First Amended Complaint,
respondents filed a motion, which urged the court to essentially ignore the First Amended
Complaint, which superseded the original complaint. [CT, Vol. II, 246]. Respondents filed
a novel motion on September 17, 2009 to "consolidate the claims made in the amended
complaint with those in plaintiffs original complaint" [CT, Vol. II, 303]. The First
Amended Complaint indeed re-alleged the single claim for abuse of process contained in
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the original complaint as count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process. But
the First Amended Complaint also contained two new and entirely distinct counts of abuse
of process (counts two and three of the first cause of action) and additional causes of action
for fraud (second cause of action) and for negligence (third cause of action). The First
Amended Complaint also alleged facts entirely new, separate, and distinct from the facts
alleged in support of the original complaint for a single count of abuse of process [CT, Vol.
II, 246-261]. Respondents nevertheless moved the court to simply consider its original
summary judgment motion as a motion for summary judgment of the entire First Amended
Complaint [CT, Vol. II, 303-346]. Accordingly, respondents failed to file a Statement of
Undisputed Facts in Support of summary adjudication of counts two and three of the First
Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, or the Third
Cause of Action for Negligence contained in the First Amended Complaint [CT, Vol. II,
246; Vol. II, 303-346].3

3

Respondents eventually claimed that a settlement agreement (purportedly effective as of
March 30, 2009) somehow barred every cause of action contained in the First Amended
Complaint for conduct committed by respondents after April 15, 2009. But, with the sole
exception of count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the First
Amended Complaint alleged claims for abuse of process (two new counts), fraud, and
negligence, which arose from respondents' separate and distinct misconduct newly
committed on and after April 15, 2009. Respondents stopped short of alleging that
appellant had actually entered into an agreement effective March 30, 2009 that waived
claims against them for any and all acts, which might be committed by respondents in the
future i.e. after March 30, 2009. And to be sure, even the sham settlement agreement,
which respondents filed in support of their motion for summary judgment of the original
complaint, does not contain any such provision. [CT, Vol. I, 142-208]. Hence, respondents
failed to file a Statement of Disputed Facts in support of summary adjudication of the new
claims alleged in the First Amended Complaint.
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On September 23, 2009, appellant filed an affidavit, which again controverted
respondents' Statement of Undisputed Facts (which pertained exclusively to count one of
the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process contained in the First Amended Complaint
[CT, Vol. II, 358]), a Separate Statement of Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues as to
Material Facts pertaining to all cause of actions contained in the First Amended Complaint
[CT, Vol. II, 366], and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition
to respondents' "consolidated" motion for summary judgment [CT, Vol. II, 347].4
Appellant also filed on September 23, 2009 a request for a hearing on respondents'
"Motion to Consolidate 'the claims made in the amended complaint with those in
plaintiffs original complaint' and for Summary Judgment" [CT, Vol. II, 380]. The district
court did not convene a separate hearing on respondents' motions [CT, Vol. II, 398].
Nevertheless, the court entered an order on October 27, 2009 granting summary judgment
of the entire First Amended Complaint for respondents [CT, Vol. II, 398].5
B.

Statement of Facts
On or about June 9, 2008, appellant filed a cross-complaint in California Superior

Court against an individual to Quiet Title to real property and for Slander of Title,
4

Inasmuch as respondents concluded that the First Amended Complaint was identical to
the original complaint, respondents in essence failed to file a motion for summary
judgment of the First Amended Complaint, or at least a motion that complied with the
procedural requirements of Utah Rules of Court
. Instead, as respondent himself puts it,
"Toscano essentially reasserted] its original summary judgment motion" [CT, Vol. II, 303,
304], which did not include a Statement of Undisputed Facts that was at all relevant to the
new causes of action contained in the First Amended Complaint.
5

The court also denied respondents' motions to dismiss for lack of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction. [CT, Vol. II, 398].
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Cancellation of Instruments, Fraud, Resulting Trust, and Conversion.6 In response to the
cross-claims, respondents filed a Chapter 7 petition in Federal Bankruptcy Court in Salt
Lake City, Utah in behalf of the individual (hereinafter the "debtor") to block and
circumvent the debtor's own California action. Yet at the time that respondents filed the
voluntary petition, respondent Toscano (the debtor's attorney) knew that the debtor did not
qualify for relief under Chapter 7 and that the debtor's filing abused Chapter 7 within the
meanings of 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1); 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I),
and 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (3). [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol.
II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's
Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules].
Respondent Toscano is a bankruptcy law expert, and he knew that a presumption of
abuse arises under 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1) if a debtor's monthly income,
reduced by allowance deductions and multiplied by sixty, is equal to or greater than
twenty-five percent of the non-priority unsecured claims or $6,575.00 (whichever is greater)
or if the product is greater than $10,950.00 ($182.50 per month). 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b)
(2) (A) (1). To be sure, the debtor and respondent Toscano had completed Means Test
Form B22 as required under 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) before filing the petition for
relief, and the results triggered the presumption that the debtor was abusing Chapter 7.
Means Test Form B22 contains an objective formula. The Means Test is designed to
separate debtors who are abusing Chapter 7 from legitimate debtors by identifying debtors
who have the ability (means) to pay creditors as a matter of law and therefore do not
6

The property is located in California, and the defendant resided in California before
moving to Utah.
17

qualify for Chapter 7 relief. Hence, respondent Toscano knew before he filed the Chapter
7 petition in behalf of the debtor that the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 7 relief. [CT,
Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, (Request for Judicial Notice of
the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules)].
Respondent Toscano also knew before he filed the petition that the debtor had the
burden pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I) to rebut the presumption that the
debtor was abusing Chapter 7. Moreover, respondent Toscano knew that the debtor was
obliged to rebut the presumption of abuse pursuant tol 1 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I)
exclusively by demonstrating "special circumstances" within the meaning of tol 1 U.S.C.
c Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I), such as a serious medical condition or a call to active duty in
the Armed Forces. Respondent Toscano also knew before he filed the petition that the
debtor could not rebut the presumption that she was abusing Chapter 7 by demonstrating
such "special circumstances" under 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I). [CT, Vol. II, 366
(Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, (Request for Judicial Notice of the United
States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules)].
Accordingly, respondent Toscano was charged with knowledge before he filed the petition
that the debtor, as a matter of law, had the ability to pay her creditors and that filing the
petition would therefore be a flagrant, per se abuse of Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. Section
707 (b) (2) (A) (1) and 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I) (1). Nevertheless, respondent
Toscano filed the petition in behalf of the debtor. [CT, Vol. II, 366].
Respondent Toscano and the debtor also admitted in their petition filed under
penalty of perjury that the debtor's California Superior Court action (Case no. MCVMS
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08151) to quiet title to real property (hereinafter the "property" or the "disputed property"),
brought pursuant to an Affidavit of Joint Tenant fraudulently executed by the debtor,
constituted a liability of the debtor for punitive damages to California attorney, Dee Davis
(for malicious prosecution) and to appellant, Joseph Billings (for slander of title).
Respondent Toscano and the debtor openly sought to discharge these liabilities for punitive
damages in their petition. Yet, at the same time, respondent Toscano duplicitously urged
the Chapter 7 Trustee to seize the property (which was the target of the malicious action
and the debtor's fraud) as the debtor's legitimate asset in order to liquidate the debtor's
small consumer debt. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378,
Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter
7 Petition and Schedules].
In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, respondent Toscano misused
court process by filing the Chapter 7 petition and causing a Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Case to be filed in California Superior Court Case No. MCVMS 08151 and enjoining its
prosecution pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362. Respondent Toscano committed these
acts characteristically in pursuit of collateral litigation advantages, i.e., (1) to circumvent
the California Superior Court quiet title and fraud actions against the debtor; (2) to cause
the Chapter 7 Trustee to improperly seize the disputed property pursuant to the debtor's
false claims to be the exclusive owner of the property; (3) to cause the Chapter 7 Trustee to
attempt to sell the property to liquidate the debtor's consumer debt, and (4) to harass
appellant, cause unnecessary delays, and escalate appellant's litigation costs. Respondent
Toscano also violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 and Chapter 13, Rule
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3.1, of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice when he ignored the results
of the Means Test and filed the petition in the foregoing acts of sharp practice. [CT, Vol.
II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the
United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules].
Therefore, on July 16, 2008, appellant amended the California cross-complaint against the
debtor to include a cause of action for flagrant abuse of process against respondent
Toscano. [CT, Vol. II, 366-377].
Appellant entered into a settlement agreement with the debtor, the Chapter 7 Trustee,
the U.S. Trustee, and respondent Toscano on January 28, 2009 (Amended March 30, 2009).
According to the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, the debtor was required
to execute a grant deed transferring all rights and interests in the disputed property to
appellant or his designate. In exchange for the debtor's execution of the grant deed
transferring exclusive title to the disputed property to appellant, appellant agreed to dismiss
his causes of action against the debtor for Slander of Title, Cancellation of Instruments,
Fraud, Resulting Trust, Conversion, and the cause of action for Abuse of Process alleged
against respondent Toscano for filing a Chapter 7 petition in 2008 in violation of 11 U.S.C.
Sections 707 (b) (1), 707 (b) (2), and 707 (b) (3) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
The terms and conditions of the settlement agreement also required respondent Toscano to
7

The United States Trustee eventually conducted an independent and disinterested
Comparative Analysis of the debtor's schedules, and the independent analysis also revealed
that a presumption of abuse arose pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1) that the
debtor was abusing Chapter 7. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II,
378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's
Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules].
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seek the bankruptcy court's approval of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement
(amended March 30? 2009) at a hearing ultimately set for August 20, 2009.
Pursuant to an agreement between respondent Toscano and appellant, appellant
drafted the essential components of the agreement (nearly the entire agreement), and
respondent Toscano was to submit the agreement to the bankruptcy court for approval
pursuant to a motion under his signature. In reliance upon respondent Toscano's
representation that he would seek the court's approval of the terms and conditions as
prepared by appellant (and approved by respondent Toscano, the debtor, the Chapter 7
Trustee, and the U.S. Trustee), appellant agreed to be bound by the agreement and
dismissed his causes of action against the debtor with prejudice after respondent Toscano,
the debtor, the Chapter 7 Trustee, and the U.S. Trustee signed the agreement. [CT, Vol. II,
366-377].
In the meantime, a disgruntled potential claimant to the property threatened to file a
complaint with the Utah State Bar against respondent Toscano for proceeding in the
bankruptcy court with a conflict of interest with the debtor unless respondent Toscano
abandoned the settlement. The claims for abuse of process had been filed against the
debtor and respondent Toscano (the debtor's attorney), and they sprang primarily from
respondent Toscano's negligence and malfeasance in abusing Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy
code in overzealous representation of the debtor. Respondent Toscano is apparently
vulnerable to state bar discipline inasmuch as he proposed settlement of the claims against
him in exchange for his arrangement of the debtor's waiver of her own potential one-third
interest in the disputed property in violation of Chapter 13, Rule 1.7, of the Utah Supreme
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Court Rules of Professional Practice. Respondent Toscano himself contributed nothing to
the settlement value. [CT, Vol. II, 366-377].
After receipt of the threat, respondent Toscano refused to seek the bankruptcy
court's approval of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (amended March 30, 2009).
[CT, Vol. II, 366-377]. Instead, on or about April 10, 2009 respondent Toscano altered the
settlement agreement drafted by appellant to unilaterally provide (1) that the disgruntled
claimant would receive an unconditional 50% interest in the property, (2) that the claimant
(heavily saddled with creditor judgments) could take title to the property in his name
pursuant to a quit claim deed to be executed by the debtor, and (3) omitting the requirement
that the debtor transfer her interests in the property to appellant pursuant to a grant deed
and adding that the debtor would transfer her interests in the property pursuant to a quit
claim deed only. [CT, Vol. II, 366-377]. In light of the fact that respondent Toscano had
wholly undermined the value of the parties' settlement agreement, appellant promptly
notified respondent Toscano in writing on April 10, 2009 that (1) respondent Toscano had
breached the parties' settlement agreement, (2) that appellant rejected the proposed
unilateral changes to the legitimate settlement agreement, (3) and that appellant was no
longer willing to dismiss or waive his pending claim against respondent Toscano for abuse
of process (filing a Chapter 7 petition in per se abuse of Chapter 7 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code in 2008).
In light of respondent Toscano's repudiation of the January 28, 2009 settlement
agreement (as amended March 30, 2009), appellant re-filed in the Utah State District Court
appellant's claim for abuse of process arising from respondents' filing of a Chapter 7
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petition in violation of the United States Bankruptcy Code. In response to appellant's
complaint, respondent Toscano deployed his signature strategy of abusing judicial
proceedings for ulterior purposes. Respondent filed groundless motions in the debtor's
name on April 30, 2009 to enjoin the state court action and to remove it to the federal
bankruptcy court. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request
for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7
Petition and Schedules]. Yet the Utah State Court action was brought exclusively against
respondent Toscano for abuse of process -not the debtor. [CT, Vol. I, 2]. As a
bankruptcy law expert, respondent Toscano knew at the time that he brought his motion in
the federal bankruptcy court in the debtor's name to enjoin the state action against him
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362 that he had no standing to bring the motion and that 11
U.S.C. Section 362 applies only to actions against the debtor or for control or possession
of the debtor's property. Additionally, respondent Toscano knew at the time that he
brought his motion in the federal bankruptcy court in the debtor's name to remove the state
action against him to federal bankruptcy court (1) that he had no standing to bring the
motion, (2) that he had brought the motion long after the statutory time had expired for
bringing removal motions, and (3) that the federal bankruptcy court has no subject matter
jurisdiction over state law claims, which are not against the debtor, the debtor's property,
or impact the debtor's estate. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II,

8

The April 30, 2009 complaint contained a single cause of action for abuse of process,
which arose from respondent Toscano's filing the abusive Chapter 7 petition. This claim is
re-alleged as count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process contained in the
First Amended Complaint filed on September 31, 2009.
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378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's
Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules].
Respondent Toscano nevertheless attempted to intimidate appellant (and the state
court) by falsely and emphatically declaring (in violation of Chapter 13, Rule 4.1, of the
Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice) that 11 U.S.C. Section 362 applied to
the debtor's attorney as well as the debtor and that the federal bankruptcy court therefore
had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs abuse of process claims.
Appellant responded to respondent's false declarations by making several requests that
respondent either provide citations to authorities in support of his motions or to withdraw
them. Respondent Toscano replied: "No comment." Respondent Toscano also failed to
reveal any authority in support of his claims at the hearing on his motions held on August
20, 2009. Respondent Toscano had simply filed the motions defiantly (1) in an attempt to
secure a more favorable venue for litigation of the state law claims against him, (2) in an
attempt to cause the bankruptcy court to issue improper rulings, which would cause
appellant to incur the costs and time expenditures necessary to appeal the rulings, (3) to
otherwise escalate appellant's litigation costs, (4) delay progress of the state court action,
and (5) to harass appellant who resides in Shanghai, China with frivolous motions in an
effort to discourage prosecution of the state court claims against him. 9

9

Respondent Toscano's attempts to frustrate prosecution of the original April 30, 2009
complaint against him by filing groundless motions in federal bankruptcy court to enjoin
and remove the action to federal bankruptcy court constitute the factual basis of count two
of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process alleged in the First Amended Complaint
filed on August 31, 2009. [CT, Vol.11, 246-261].
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Then, respondent Toscano cut and pasted the parties' January 28, 2009 settlement
agreement (as amended March 30, 2009), which appellant had initially drafted, and
unilaterally altered it to (1) provide that the disgruntled claimant would receive an
unconditional 50% interest in the property, (2) to provide that the claimant could take title
to the property in his name despite crippling debt pursuant to a quit claim deed to be
executed by the debtor, and (4) to omit the requirement that the debtor transfer her interests
in the property to appellant pursuant to a grant deed and adding that the debtor would
transfer her interests in the property pursuant to a quit claim deed only. [CT, Vol. II, 366377]. Respondent Toscano presented the altered January 28, 2009 agreement (as amended
March 30, 2009) as his own product to the bankruptcy court and filed the fraudulent
document as the parties' true settlement agreement in the bankruptcy court on April 15,
2009. Respondent also falsely reported to the court in violation of Chapter 13, Rule 3.3 of
the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice [making false statements to a
tribunal] that appellant had agreed to the unilateral changes. [CT, Vol. II, 347-357; 366377]. In response to respondent Toscano' post-April 15, 2009 conduct, appellant filed a
First Amended Complaint on August 31, 2009 in the Utah District court alleging new
counts of Abuse of Process, Fraud, and Negligence.10
The bankruptcy court set August 20, 2009 for a hearing on respondents' motions to
enjoin the Utah State Court proceedings, removal of the state court proceedings to federal

10

Respondent Toscano's preparation and filing of the sham settlement agreement in federal
bankruptcy court constitute the basis of count three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse
of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for
Negligence contained in the First Amended Complaint.
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bankruptcy court, and settlement of the debtor's estate. The federal bankruptcy court
denied defendant's motions to enjoin the state court action against him and to remove the
state court action to federal bankruptcy court. The court declared that it could find no
authority that "even remotely supports" defendant Toscano's motion to enjoin the state
court action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362 since the action was brought exclusively
against respondent and not the debtor. The court also ruled that the federal bankruptcy
court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the state court claims against respondent
because they were not alleged against the debtor nor did they impact the debtor's estate.
[CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial
Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and
Schedules].11
The bankruptcy court also approved settlement of the debtor's estate according to
the terms and conditions contained in the sham settlement agreement. Respondents falsely
represented to the court that appellant had agreed to the terms and conditions of the
unilaterally altered, unsigned agreement, which respondents had submitted to the court
in place of the agreement actually drafted and entered into by appellant.12 The bankruptcy
court granted the motion to settle the debtor's estate, but declined appellant's request to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to (1) determine the terms and conditions of the settlement;
11

In light of these rulings, appellant is actually entitled as a matter of law to summary
judgment of at least count two of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process and the
Third Cause of Action for Negligence contained in the First Amended Complaint.
12

Appellant had provided e-mail approval of the parties' original January 28, 2009
settlement agreement. Respondents falsely advised the bankruptcy court and the Utah
District Court that the e-mail approval pertained to the unilaterally altered version of the
parties' agreement.
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(2) allow appellant an opportunity to introduce written evidence (pre-marked and lodged
with the clerk) to demonstrate that respondents had altered the parties' original settlement
agreement; and (3) to establish that appellant had withdrawn his offer to dismiss his claim
for abuse of process against respondents (count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse
of Process) in writing because respondents refused to honor the terms and conditions of
the parties original settlement agreement. Having asserted the bankruptcy court's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over this state court action, the bankruptcy court did not
consider any of the claims currently alleged in the First Amended Complaint. [CT, Vol. II,
366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the
United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules].
VI
ARGUMENT
A.

Summary of the Argument

1.

It is well established that courts do not decide factual disputes on summary

judgment motion; they simply decide whether there is a factual dispute or genuine issue of
law. Respondents claimed in the district court that the original complaint filed on April 30,
2009 (which was ultimately re-alleged as count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse
of Process in the First Amended Complaint) was barred by a prior settlement agreement
purportedly effective March 30, 2009. But appellant denied respondents' claim and filed
an Affidavit Controverting Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts and an Affidavit of
Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues to demonstrate that (1) respondents had actually
repudiated the parties' legitimate January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended
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March 30, 2009); (2) that respondents unilaterally altered the legitimate agreement to
create a sham, unsigned settlement agreement (which respondents filed in support of
summary judgment); and (3) that appellant had rejected the unilateral changes and
withdrew the original offer of settlement in writing. Appellant's affidavits were sufficient
to refute, and establish disputed facts and genuine issues pertaining to, respondents'
affirmative defense of "prior settlement" to count one of the First Cause of Action for
Abuse of Process as alleged in the First Amended Complaint (and all other claims
alleged in the First Amended Complaint) . One good faith affidavit controverting the
moving parties' assertion of undisputed facts is sufficient to overcome summary judgment.
Therefore, the district court should have denied respondents' motion for summary
judgment in light of the controverting affidavits.
2.

Additionally, respondents failed to file a Statement of Undisputed Facts in

support of their second "consolidated" motion for summary judgment of the First
Amended Complaint, which alleged new causes of action with factual bases entirely
distinct from the original complaint (counts two and three of the First Cause of Action for
Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action
for Negligence). The district court should have denied the "consolidated" motion for
summary judgment on this ground alone.
3.

Appellant, on the other hand, filed an Affidavit of Disputed Facts and

Genuine Issues in support of each of the causes of action contained in the First Amended
Complaint. Moreover, appellant demonstrated by affidavit that counts two and three of
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the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and
the Third Cause of Action for Negligence arose from acts committed by respondents after
the effective date (March 30, 2009) of the sham settlement agreement filed by respondents.
Accordingly, the affidavit demonstrated that even the sham settlement agreement filed by
respondents in support of summary judgment of the original complaint (and "reasserted"
against the First Amended Complaint) did not contain a provision that releases
respondents from all future conduct committed after March 30, 2009. Hence, appellant's
affidavits and respondents' own exhibit (the sham settlement agreement itself) were
sufficient to establish disputed facts and genuine issues pertaining to all of the causes of
action newly alleged in the First Amended Complaint. The district court, therefore, should
have denied respondents' "consolidated" motion for summary judgment of the First
Amended Complaint.
4.

Since the affidavits filed by appellant were facially sufficient to overcome a

summary judgment motion, respondents had only one avenue left open to them to pursue
summary judgment, namely to demonstrate that all of the causes of action alleged or
issues contained in the First Amended Complaint had already been decided after an
evidentiary hearing in a separate action such that each cause of action might be barred by
the affirmative defenses of res judicata or collateral estoppel. But respondents not only
failed to assert these affirmative defenses in support of their summary judgment motion,
they actually insisted emphatically before the district court that neither affirmative
defense was relevant to their motions. Hence, respondents are bound by this admission
on appeal, and respondents cannot, in any case, assert affirmative defenses on appeal in
29

support of summary judgment {res judicata or collateral estoppel), which they failed to
assert and in fact vigorously disclaimed and urged the trial court to ignore.
5.

The trial court did in fact ignore the due process requirements of res judicata

and collateral estoppel The district court characterized appellant's opposition to the
respondents' summary judgment motion as a collateral attack on the federal bankruptcy
court judgment. But appellant did not attack the federal court judgment in the Utah
District Court. That judgment stands and now controls disposition of the debtor's estate.
But it does not control disposition of separate state court claims against respondents for
damages, especially damages claimed against respondents for obtaining the judgment
itself hy fraud and malfeasance. Appellant simply contended that the federal bankruptcy
court judgment cannot determine the claims or issues in this separate action alleging
state law claims for damages against respondents because the order settling the
debtor's estate did not satisfy the requirements of res judicata (prior determination of same
causes of action after an evidentiary hearing) or collateral estoppel (prior determination of
controlling issues after an evidentiary hearing) such that it might determine the claims or
issues raised in this separate action. Lawlor v. National Screen Services Corporation 39
U.S. 322, 327. None of the causes of action or any controlling issue contained in this
Utah State Court action was determined in the federal court after an evidentiary hearing.
And even the sham "settlement agreement" approved by the federal bankruptcy court
related exclusively to count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process
contained in the First Amended Complaint. Appellant's second and third counts of abuse
of process, the second cause of action for fraud, and the third cause of action for
30

negligence each arose from acts committed by respondents after the date of the approved
sham settlement (filing groundless motions, sham documents, and securing settlement of
the debtor's estate through fraud and malfeasance). None of these claims was even before
the bankruptcy court, much less determined after an evidentiary hearing.
6.

Moreover, the district court overlooked the fact that the bankruptcy court

also declared that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims alleged in the state
court action and that it also lacked grounds to enjoin them. Hence, in light of all of the
bankruptcy court orders, appellant—not respondent- is ultimately entitled to summary
judgment of at least count two of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process and the
Third Cause of Action for Negligence, which arose from respondents' filing of frivolous
motions (filed after even the sham settlement agreement was purportedly entered into by
the parties) to enjoin the April 30, 2009 state court action and remove it to federal
bankruptcy court.
7.

Additionally, the court overlooked that count three of the First Cause of

Action for Abuse of Process and the Second Cause of Action for Fraud allege that the
bankruptcy court order (settling the debtor's estate) was itself obtained through
respondents' fraud and malfeasance. These claims seek compensatory and punitive
damages against respondents for (1) obtaining the order itself through malfeasance and (2)
committing fraud against appellant by repudiating the parties' legitimate settlement
agreement after appellant dismissed his claims against the debtor for punitive damages
with prejudice. These claims have never been considered by any court. Accordingly,
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they would not be subject to dismissal pursuant to res judicata or collateral estoppel, even
if respondents had actually asserted (instead of disclaiming) these affirmative defenses in
the district court.
B.

The Argument

1.
The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Adjudication of Count One of
the First Cause Of Action for Abuse of Process Because Appellant Controverted
Respondents5 Assertion of Prior Settlement of the Claim and Established Disputed
Material Facts and Genuine Issues In Support of the Cause of Action
Count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process contained in the First
Amended Complaint alleges that respondent Toscano abused court process in 2008 by
filing a Chapter 7 petition in behalf of an individual whom respondent knew did not qualify
for Chapter 7 relief. [CT, Vol. II, 246]. Respondent Toscano claimed in the trial court that
a January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended March 30, 2009) constitutes a prior
settlement of the claim and that the alleged settlement agreement therefore bars count one
of the first cause of action for abuse of process.
In accordance with the rules of summary judgment practice, appellant (plaintiff)
filed opposition to the motion for summary judgment on August 27, 2009, which
incorporated a memorandum of points and authorities, a statement controverting
respondents' statement of undisputed facts, and a statement of disputed facts and genuine
issues [CT, Vol. II, 209-224]. On August 31, 2009 appellant filed a separate Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition to respondent's motion [CT, Vol. II,
225] and a Separate Statement of Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues [CT, Vol. II, 234].
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Appellant's affidavits contained testimony that respondent Toscano repudiated and
breached the January 28,2009 settlement agreement (as amended on March 30, 2009) on
April 10, 2009. The affidavits also contained testimony that appellant notified respondent
Toscano in writing on April 10, 2009 that appellant had withdrawn his offer to waive
claims for abuse of process committed by respondent Toscano in 2008 because Toscano
had repudiated and breached the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended
March 30, 2009) and demanded unilateral material changes to the parties' agreement.
Appellant also plainly alleged that he had rejected in writing respondent's altered version
of the parties' January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended March 30, 2009). [CT,
Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol. II, 225; CT, Vol. II, 234].
Since appellant controverted respondent Toscano's central claim that appellant is
bound by an effective settlement agreement that obligates appellant to waive his claim for
abuse of process committed by respondent Toscano in April 2008, the trial court should
have denied respondent Toscano's motion for summary judgment. On summary judgment
motion, courts do not decide factual disputes; they simply determine whether there is a
factual dispute. Holbrook Company v. Adams 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). Summary
judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Adamson v. Multi Cmty.
Diversified Services, Inc. 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008). And it takes only one
sworn, good faith affidavit to create a genuine issue of fact in order to preclude summary
judgment. Holbrook Company v. Adams 542 P.2d 191.
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2.
The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's
Estate Did Not Bar Count One of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process or
Any Other Cause of Action Contained in First Amended Complaint Because
Respondents Failed to Assert and Explicitly Waived the Affirmative Defenses of Res
Judicata or Collateral Estoppel in the Trial Court
Respondent Toscano filed a unilaterally altered and disputed settlement agreement
in support of his first motion for summary judgment. In his first motion for summary
judgment, respondent Toscano claimed that the disputed agreement barred appellant's
claim against him for abusing Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2008.
[CT, Vol I, 209]. [Respondent Toscano subsequently alleged in a "consolidated" motion
for summary judgment that the bankruptcy court's approval of settlement of the debtor's
estate according to the altered agreement barred appellant's new claims alleged against
Toscano in the First Amended Complaint for seeking approval of settlement of the estate
by committing fraud and submitting an "agreement" obtained by fraud]. Yet respondent
Toscano was also adamant before the trial court that he was not asserting the affirmative
defenses of res judicata or collateral estoppel and that he in fact rejected the applicability
of these affirmative defenses to his motion for summary judgment

Respondent Toscano

explicitly waived these affirmative defenses as follows during oral argument of his motion
for summary judgment:
Paul Guyon (for defendant Toscano): "So, this is not a question of res judicata.
It's not a question of collateral estoppel, it's a question that Mr. Billings bargained
away, whatever claims he may have had, and that boat sailed. Those claims are no
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longer and for that reason he does not have a right to assert them in this case and
that's why we're asking for summary judgment." [RT, 8, Lines 5-11].13
Collateral estoppel (and by analogy, res judicata) are affirmative defenses that must
be raised by the party seeking their benefits in the trial court, or else they are waived. See,
e.g., Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 35 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 488
U.S. 948 (1988).[Holding that collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be
asserted by the party seeking to benefit from it or it is waived]. Hence, respondent
Toscano not only waived the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel by
failing to assert them in the trial court, but he explicitly rejected them, urged the trial court
to reject them, and he refused to satisfy his burden of proof that he was entitled to assert
such affirmative defenses to any cause of action contained in the First Amended Complaint.
Respondent Toscano vigorously elected to disclaim the affirmative defenses of res
judicata or collateral estoppel and to stand emphatically on his Statement of Undisputed
Facts. Therefore, the trial court should have simply denied respondents' summary
judgment motion on the basis of appellant's controverting affidavits in accordance with
Holbrook Company v. Adams, supra., Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 7 (c)(3)(A).

13

Appellant, of course, controverted respondent's claim and asserted that Toscano himself
had repudiated the parties' only legitimate agreement, and that Toscano had submitted a
fraudulent "agreement" in support of summary judgment. [CT, Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol.
II, 225; CT, Vol. II, 234]. Hence, the parties had stated a well-framed genuine dispute of
material facts.
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3.
The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's
Estate Did Not In Any Case Satisfy the Requirements of Res Judicata or Collateral
Estoppel And Even if Respondents had not Waived these Affirmative Defenses, the
Trial Court Should Have Denied Summary Judgment on the Basis of Appellant's
Affidavits
The trial court accepted respondents' express waiver of the affirmative defenses of
res judicata and collateral estoppel without comment [RT? 8, Lines 5-11] and accordingly
did not analyze the applicability of the affirmative defenses to respondents' summary
judgment motion according to governing case law or legal principles of any sort. [CT, Vol.
II, 398-402 (order after ruling)]. Hence, the trial court should have denied respondents'
summary judgment motion on the basis of appellant's controverting affidavits in
accordance with Holbrook Company v. Adams, supra. But the trial court erred by failing to
follow Holbrook, and it compounded this error by essentially giving respondents the
benefit of the affirmative defenses, which the court not only failed to analyze according to
governing principles, but respondents themselves had refused to assert and expressly
waived. [RT, 8, Lines 5-11].
The court under-analyzed and misanalyzed all of the claims alleged in the First
Amended Complaint and the issues before it as follows:
"Plaintiffs claims in the First Amended Complaint can be categorized as either (a)
claims that challenge what happened in the bankruptcy court in order to get that
court's approval of the settlement agreement, or (b) claims that would be
extinguished by the settlement agreement." [CT, Vol. II, 398-402 (ruling after
hearing)].
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The ruling contains no analysis of the effect of appellant's controverting affidavits (which
denied that appellant had entered into the settlement agreement), the law of summary
judgment (e.g. Holbrook Company v. Adams, supra., Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (c)(3)(A).), or the requirements ofres judicata or
collateral estoppel In fact, the ruling ignores all of appellant's citations to leading cases
and does not contain a case citation or court rule in support of it. [CT, Vol. II, 398-402
(ruling after hearing)]. Moreover, the trial court also overlooked in its analysis the fact that
the bankruptcy court also declared that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
alleged in the state court action and that it also lacked grounds to enjoin them. Hence, in
light of all of the bankruptcy court orders, appellant, not respondent, is ultimately entitled
to summary judgment of at least count two of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of
Process and the Third Cause of Action for Negligence, which arose from respondents'
filing of frivolous motions (filed after even the sham settlement agreement was purportedly
entered into by the parties) to enjoin the April 30, 2009 state court action and remove it to
federal bankruptcy court.14
14

Curiously, the trial court declared that it was aware that the bankruptcy court had
unequivocally rejected Toscano's motion asserting that the federal court had exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged him. And in light of the trial
court's own incredulous view of the claims, respondent withdrew them.[RT. 4-5]. Hence,
the trial court itself identified grounds in the bankruptcy court's rulings for granting
summary judgment for appellant on at least count two of the First Amended Complaint for
abusing process in light of Toscano's filing of specious motions, which he instantly
withdrew in light of the trial court's dim view of them. Of course, Toscano withdrew the
claims only after refusing to do so upon appellant's request and forcing appellant to travel
from Shanghai, China to Utah to oppose the motions in federal bankruptcy court and the
Utah state court at great expense and hardship. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed
Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code
and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. Nothing in even the sham settlement
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The trial court having ignored respondent Toscano's explicit waiver of the
affirmative defense of res judicata and collateral estoppel, should, in any case, have
followed Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corporation 349 U.S. 322 (1953) and denied
respondents' summary judgment motion. The United States Supreme Court in Lawlor
rejected a claim advanced there that is nearly identical to the claim, which the trial court
appears to have advanced for respondent Toscano despite his explicit waiver and
disclaimer of the affirmative defenses. In Lawler, petitioners brought an antitrust action
against National Screen and three motion picture producers. Petitioners alleged in their
1942 action that defendants had conspired to establish a monopoly in the distribution of
motion picture advertising inasmuch as the producers entered into exclusive licensing
agreements with National Screen to manufacture and lease such material. The federal
district court dismissed the 1942 lawsuit with prejudice pursuant to a settlement entered
into by the parties before trial and ordered defendant National Screen to enter into
proposed advertising licensing agreements with petitioners. However, the court made no
findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning petitioners' causes of action or the
validity of the licensing agreements envisioned by the parties' settlement agreement. 349
U.S. 322, 327.
In 1949, petitioners brought a subsequent similar action against the same defendants
alleging essentially that the settlement of the 1942 suit and that the agreements, which

agreement submitted by respondents waives appellant's claims for these abuses committed
by Toscano after the effective date of the alleged settlement agreement. Even the sham
settlement agreement refers exclusively to the abuse of process committed by Toscano in
filing an improper Chapter 7 petition in 2008 and the debtor's liability for malicious
prosecution for filing of a groundless complaint in California.
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sprang from the settlement were merely bad faith devices, which defendants simply utilized
to perpetuate anti-trust violations. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the subsequent
action alleging that the 1942 settlement agreement barred the subsequent action according
to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district held that some
features of the subsequent action were barred under principles of res judicata, but others
were not barred under principles of collateral estoppel The Supreme Court overruled the
district court's finding that res judicata barred some causes of action contained in
plaintiffs subsequent action and affirmed the district court's ruling that collateral estoppel
did not bar any cause of action contained in the new complaint.
The Supreme Court concurred with the district court that the principles of res
judicata bar a second trial on the same causes of action that were adjudicated on the
merits in a prior lawsuit involving the same parties. However, the Supreme Court
emphasized that a prior judgment is res judicata only as to suits involving the same causes
of action, and the court disagreed that the subsequent lawsuit involved the same causes of
action as the initial suit. 349 U.S. 322, 329, 330. The Supreme Court explained further that
the settlement agreement entered into by the parties in the initial action did not otherwise
collaterally estoppe plaintiff from bringing new actions pertaining to the same issues as the
initial action because the action was not tried and the district court did not make findings of
fact or conclusions of law binding the parties as to any issue, including the legality of the
license agreements, which sprang from the settlement. 349 U.S. 322, 326, 327. The court
below concluded that "no question of collateral estoppel by the former judgment
(settlement) is involved, because the case was never tried, and there was not, therefore,
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such finding of fact which will preclude the parties to that litigation from questioning the
finding thereafter;5 and the Supreme Court affirmed 349 U.S. 323-330.
Under Utah law, res judicata (claim preclusion) does not apply unless three
requirements are met: (1) [t]he subsequent action must involve the same parties, their
privies, or their assigns as the first action, (2) the claim to be barred must have been
brought or have been available in the first action, and (3) the first action must have
produced a final judgment on the merits of the claim." See Brigham Young Univ. v.
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678 (Utah 2005); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline
Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995), and Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 16 P.3d
1214 (Utah 2000). Collateral Estoppel (issue preclusion) does not apply, unless four
elements are satisfied: (1) [t]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have
been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (2) the issue decided in
the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (3) the
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Brigham Young Univ. v.
Tremco Consultants, Inc., supra; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., supra, and
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc. supra.
Here, there is no question that approval of settlement of the debtor's estate did not
constitute a judgment on the merits of any cause of action alleged in the First Amended
Complaint. Indeed, the bankruptcy court declared its lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over this state court action, and the bankruptcy court did not consider any of the claims
currently alleged in the First Amended Complaint. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed
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Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code
and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. Moreover, respondent Toscano was
not a party in the bankruptcy court proceeding.
Similarly, there is no question that the bankruptcy court did not try or litigate any
cause of action involving the same issues as any cause of action alleged in the First
Amended Complaint; nor did the bankruptcy court issue any sort of findings of fact or
conclusions of law binding the parties as to any issue relevant to any cause of action
contained in the First Amended Complaint. Indeed, the bankruptcy court did not even
conduct an evidentiary hearing on any issue pertaining to any cause of action contained in
the First Amended Complaint. Presumably, this is precisely why respondent Toscano
denied that his motion for summary judgment depended in the least upon principles of res
judicata or collateral estoppel and he elected to disclaim these affirmative defenses and
stand exclusively on the Statement of Undisputed Facts, which he filed in support of his
motion for summary judgment of the original complaint. 15
What's more, the second and third counts of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of
Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for
15

Respondent Toscano filed a sham version of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement
(as amended on March 30, 2009) on April 15, 2009 for the court's approval. Appellant
immediately filed objections. The court set August 20, 2009 for a hearing on the
objections. But inexplicably the court refused to allow appellant to lay a foundation and to
introduce documentary evidence (pre-marked and lodged with the court clerk) to
demonstrate that respondent Toscano had repudiated and breached the January 28, 2009
settlement agreement (as amended March 30, 2009) and had submitted a sham document
containing unilateral changes to the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended
March 30, 2009) on April 15, 2009. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT,
Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the
Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]
41

Negligence are each predicated, upon misconduct committed by defendant Toscano after
Menu* • . :*>•- i,;c eiicciivL uak ol me alleged settlement agreement). Respondent

summary adjudication of the foregoing causes of action. But Toscano nevertheless appears
to claim that the sham version of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended

and filed in support of summary j udgment of the orig WA1

• r. p! ; •+ \r\\ :<.-' \M *

committed by Toscano after the effective date of the alleged agreement (March 30, 2009)
and for anv acts that he might still c vmmit in the future. But not even the sham,, settlement
atint merit which deferh

f

i •

-

!

i

an incredible provision. And ! oseann did not oxen attempt to support thib claim wiiL a
Statement ot Lndispuku i ^i> lvespondcnt simply asked the trial court to abandon even a
. • *•

. uled Complaint foi

post March 30, 2009 misconduct on a summary judgment motion without supporting
evidence of any kind, (much less undisputed evidence).
r

l 1 le trial c : >i n t indeed < iolated di le j:: i ocess of la • < v li sn it acquiesced and granted

summary judgment of claims, which appellant has never had an opportunity to fairly and
fully litigate before any tribunal. The trial court should not have uiven res judicata and
collatei al estoppel effect to tl: le I: at lki ijptc;> cour I: oi der settling L_ dc;.^.i > c>.,;;^ because
respondent explicitly disclaimed these affirmative defenses and the oi dei in ait) « case did
not satisfy the requirements of these special defenses. Ilierefore, the trial court should
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haw denied respondents' motion for sum.iiiaryjudg.niei.it on the basis of appellant's
controverting aiiidavits.
4.
Respondents F ailed to F ile a Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of
Summary Adjudication of Counts Two and Three of the First Cause of Action for
Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of
Action for Negligence Contained in the First Amended Complaint.
Appellant has demonstrated that respondents taiiu.imi^ a Statement

rtf

summary judgment of the First Amended Complaint. In response to appellant's First
Amended Comprint, respondent Toscano simply -Hied i novel motion on September \n,
1

:

original complain:*' L ^t, l u . . n • •
appellant objected in writing N» ihe
sumi iiai y . ^.r
s

.

:

•? = ; >f respondents' loreiioinu failure,
L<HUI

consideration of Toseano's second nu^im for

, ..;-*_.,u^; ^:.;;)i.^

- :"M".41ant has also demonstrated that th/-

* -' \* -

1 1.1 3 1 / 3 49, n 2]
plaint contained t vv c tie \¥

and entirely distinct counts of abuse of process (counts two and three of the first cause of
actiwii) ana aOu,..,,„ii causes of duHm ,,.; .raud (second cause of action) and for

entirely new, separate, and distinct from the facts alleged in support of the original
complaint for a single count of abuse of process. And ^ddi new cause of action alleged
m i s c o i u l i u I i*(iiii 11 i I ni, mi 111 Il I , iii ,|Ni, imidtiil i i l ' l n the ;illq>oil r l t n lis v dale of I h r

S1II„IIII

settlement agreement, which respondent filed i;*.-- . <
• *u of his motion for summary
judgment of the original complaint [CT Vol. II. 1:40-261]. Respondents, nevertheless,
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simply moved the court to consider its original summary judgment motion as a motion
for summary judgment ui inc enine i HM \mended v. Miipiamt [< 1. \ oi. li. J U O - M < > | .

summary adjudication of counts two and three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of
Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, or the Third Cause of Action for

346].
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Sect; .t "fc)(3)(A) ••: • !.
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r :\y ,. >U'ji as amui-Aiis oi .i^covery materials, i ach tact set .onii in

the n u n i n g part) s memorandum is deemed admitted l«-r the purpose r-f summary
judgment unless controverted fay the responding party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
!

' *

i .

, TA v>^v, v u, on motion for summ '*-• * -; Miuii, the moving party "bears the initial burden of
making a prima facie demonstration oi the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and
•i •

\\ iiue^el v. ^engenpergci. -.. ^ i

..

(10th Cir. 2000). Respondent Toscano failed to even attempt to satisfy this i m u -

*• 7
v-i

with respect to counts two arid three of the First Cause of Actioi foi \ b u s e of Process, the
Second Cause of Action foi I raud, and the ' I hird Cause of i I c U .» MM segligence.
Therefore thr tn.il I'OM'I Ji >iild h;iw d u n n l h>s< .mo , molion i u iiinuiiiio nlfinln .iliun
of these claims in light of his failure to satisfy the prima facie and procedural requirements
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of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Section 7 (c)(3)(A) and Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222
F.3d861/ J
5.
t iic 1 rial Court Should Have Denied Respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgment of the First Amended Complaint Because Appellant Filed Sufficient
Affidavits to Establish a Genuine Factual Dispute Concerning Claims that Toscano
Asserted a Settlement Agreement Obtained by Fraud in Support of Summary
Judgment

of Process and the Second Cause of Action for Fraud allege that the bankruptcy court
order (settling the debtor's estate) was itself obtained through respondents" fraud .JMJ
M

\:'-

V. •.:!•.

..

•

• All

, L . e - JLU: • ; > ; .

~.pi>::^IUS

for (1) obtaining the order itself through malfeasance ami (2) coinmiuiniT frai^ rjainst
appellant h) repudiating the parties' legitimate settlement agreement after appellant
:• . -V'I, .*,

.. ^ a i h ' ^ i u J . ; ' . , ... ,)Li.iU\*. damages with prejudice, . iiese v»aniis

have never been considered

u

V . •

dismissal pursuant to res judicata or col lateral estoppel, even if respondents had actually
asserteu < ;,..uu, , • * A\scidu\\iu±i uie.ic aim mauve delenses m tlu diMiict court.
Appellant filed a detailed affidavit outlining the continuing fraud committed by
respondent' Foscano |
'losf.tllup

, iliiolliiiii (iri

• lerelbre. the trial court, should have denied
liililii , i i ) | l i l i ^ l 1 1 t 1 l 1

i i U l S i l i l l i III i

I ^ , n p i i (liciilt'il li|)i)h

1 ll i i n l i i l i l l t

settlement agreement. Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity & Guarantee Insurance.
Underwriters 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965),
16

Appellant nevertheless filed exhaustive affidavits, which established genuine disputed
facts as to each claim alleged in the Firsl Amended Cmnplaini !' Y. Vol II. 209-224; CT,
Vol II, 225; CT, Vol II, 234].
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VII
~ ~ I'LUSION
in iigiii ot the foregoing, appelant;espcctfUlly requests that the court reverse the

February 24, 2010. Appellant also respectfully requests that the court award costs of
appeal.

5*

Kipectftill^ Submitted,
Joseph Billings
Appellant, In Pro Per
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n*Jud«rfa» District
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C(lMty J 2QQ3
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA^LT
umcbui&Y
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENTAL,
^PUtyoBrtT

JOSEPH BILLINGS,

RULING

Plaintiff,

Case No. 090907164

v.

Judge Denise P. Lindberg

PAUL TOSCANO, etal,

Date: October 27,2009

Defendants,

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Consolidate and
for Summary Judgment and for Fees and Costs.* Having fully considered the Motions:
(1) Defendants5 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and
(2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in that claims axe DISMISSED, but
dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE in the ovQiit Plaintiff prevails in his appeal to the U.S. District
Court of Judge Bouiden's August 29,,J Order.
/.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack ofJurisdiction and Improper Service
Defendants argued their MotiontoDismiss at the hearing on September 1,2009. At the hearing, the

Court indicated that the Motion to Dismiss lacked merit. The Court remains convinced that Motion to
Dismiss should be denied. First, regardless of defects in the first service of process, it appears that
Defendants have now been properly served. Second, tlae Court concludes, and Defendants concede, that this
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action.2
1

Defendants' original Morion for Summary Judgment discussed how the claims raised in die
Complaint were extinguished by a settlement and order in Bankruptcy Court, Plaintiff has now filed
a First Amended Complaint and Defendants responded with die present Motion for Summary
Judgment Because Defendants have reasserted die arguments from die first Motion that remain
applicable to the First Amended Complaint, the second Motion for Summary Judgment supercedes
thefirstand die Court will only address die second Motion.
2

In any event, Mr. Toscano appeared in Court and,filed motions seeking substantive relief.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Mr. Toscano has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this
Court,

BILLINGS V. TOSCANO
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RULING

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
h his First Amended Complaint,3 Plaintiff raises three claims for abuse ofprocess, a claim for fraud,

and a claim for negligence.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff s claims were extinguished by Judge Boulden's August 20, 2009
Order in Bankruptcy Court which accepted the parties' settlement agreement The settlement agreement
stated that "the Parties hereby mutually release each other from any and all claims, debts, obligations,
actions, demands, . . , , including any actions for abuse of process or malicious prosecution, whether
grounded in law or equity, whether known or unknown,,. ."Order Approving Settlement among Debtor
Antoinette Billings, Debtor's Counsel, JosephM. Billings, John H. Billings, and Chapter 7 Trustee Elizabeth
R. Loveridge, Exhibit 1 at f 4. Plaintiff asserts that he did not agree to the settlement which was approved
by the Bankruptcy Court. Instead, he says that Defendants fraudulently presented the settlement to Judge
Boulden. At the hearing on September 1,2009, Plaintiff represented that he had attempted to raise the fraud
issue to Judge Boulden, but was unsuccessful. Also on September 1, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
challenging Judge Boulden's Order. Notably, Plaintiffdid not request that either Judge Boulden or the U. S.
District Court stay the effect of the Order pending appeal.
Plaintiffs claims in the First Amended Complaint can be categorized as either (a) claims that
challenge what happened before the Bankruptcy Court in order to get that Court's approval of the settlement
agreement, or (b) claims that would be extinguished by the settlement agreement.
3

The First Amended Complaint is properly before the Court because, although Defendants
hadfiledmotions for summary judgment and dismissal, the Court had not ruled on those motions
when die First Amended Complaint was filed. Additionally, Defendants had not yet filed their
responsive pleading. See Utah of Civil Procedure 15(a).
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As the Court intimated at the September 1,2009 hearing, Plaintiff cannot collaterally attack in this
Court the Banlcruptcy Court's decision to approve the settlement Plaintiffs relieffromthat Order, if any,
must come from the Bankruptcy Court orfromthe reviewing District Court.4 This Court must accept the
Bankruptcy Court's ruling that the settlement is acceptable; it will not consider argument regarding the
enforceability of a settlement agreementfthat another Court has ratified. Therefore, all of Plaintiffs claims
that challenge the court-approved settlement itself must be dismissed. Those issues are reserved solely to
the Banlcruptcy Court or the District Court on appeal.
Moreover, as long as Judge Boulden's August 20,2009 Order stands, it is also not appropriate for
this Court to consider those claims by Plaintiff that are/were extinguished by the terms of the settlement
agreement. Those claims must also be dismissed.
However, because there is an appeal pending or Judge Boulden's August 29, 2009 Order, the
dismissal of the claims is granted without prejudice to Plaintiff in the event he prevails on his appeal to the
District Court on those issues.
Finally, Defendants have provided no authority to support their claim of entitlement to attorney's fees
and costs. Their request is denied.

4

U.S District Court No. 09-828 (Campbell, J,)
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ORDER
(1)

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

(2)

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims are
DISMISSED. However, because the matter is under appeal, DISMISSAL IS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE in the event Plaintiff prevails on appeal to District Court of Judge Boulden's
August 29,2009 Order.

(3)

Defendants' request for fees and costs is DENIED.

DATED this 27 day of October, 2009,

Judge Denise/PnsjHHtJerg
District Court Judge
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 1, 2009

2

JUDGE DENISE LINDBERG

3

(Transcrib er's note: speaker identification

4

may not b e accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:
090907164 f

Jot seph Bi llings vs. Paul James Toscano and PaLUl

Toscano P .C.
9

MR. GUYON: Thank you, Judge. Shall I argue my
motion?

12
13

If I could have parties and counsel state your

appearances.

10
11

We're on the record on Case No.

THE COURT:

Well, first state your appearance

MR. GUYON:

Oh, okay, I'm sorry.

please.

14

Peter Guyon

15

represent ing Mr. Toscano and Paul Toscano, a professional

16

corporation.

17

THE COURT:

18

And you are Mr. Billings?

19

MR. BILLINGS:

20

Billings, plaintiff.

21

THE COURT:

22

Thank you.

Yes, good morning Your Honor, Joseph

All right, thank you.

All right, Mr.

Toscano is al 30 pres ent.

23

All right.

We have several motions, the latest of

24

which was fil(sd as a request for an expedited - well, let me

25

go back.

We first h ad the issues about whether
1

1

or not the present motion should be dismissed for lack of

2

personal jurisdiction and I have subject matter jurisdiction

3

and then most recently then there was a memo and motion filed

4

for an expedited hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment,

5

the response to which I only received this morning from Mr.

6

Billings but I have reviewed it.

7

received that response?

8
9

MR. GUYON:

I don't know when you

I just received it about 10 minutes

ago, Judge.

10

THE COURT:

Do you need additional time to -

11

MR. GUYON:

No, I'd be happy to argue the summary

12

judgment motion.

I'm prepared to do so.

13

THE COURT:

All right.

14

you can proceed to the podium.

15

MR. GUYON:

These are your motions, so

Thank you, Judge.

I'd like to, if I

16

may with leave of the Court, I'd like to discuss the issue of

17

jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction first and there's a

18

number of facts which I believe are undisputed.

19

2009 a gentleman appeared at Mr. Toscano's office and

20

attempted apparently to serve him —

21

THE COURT:

On April 30,

Let me shorten this whole discussion

22

because I've looked at that and whether or not the first

23

service was deficient which it appears it might have been,

24

the second service which was made, although I have a second

25

affidavit from Mr. Toscano, I also have an affidavit from the

1

constable that is entitled to a strong presumption of

2

regularity and clearly states that Mr. Toscano was served

3

personally with not only the complaint but the summons as

4

well.

5

that's, you know, that presumption of regularity that

6

attaches to the constable's return of service is something

7

that I want to address there.

8

about the first service.

So, this is not obviously an evidentiary hearing but

9

MR. GUYON:

Okay.

I don't think we need to worry

And thank you for the

10

opportunity to respond to that.

11

not been served with a copy of the affidavit of the constable

12

which I believe is Mr. Billings responsibility to serve upon

13

me, so I have not seen that.

14
15
16

In the first place, I have

THE COURT:

Oh, I did not realize that you hadn't

MR. GUYON:

Right.

seen that.
So, from our standpoint, that

17

is not before the Court because it wasn't served on opposing

18

counsel which Mr. Billings is obliged to do if he intends to

19

utilize that in connection with his arguments.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

It was filed by the process server in

this matter.
MR. GUYON:

Right, but certainly Mr. Billings would

23

have control of his process server and should have served it

24

on me, but did not.

25

kind of a certificate of service showing service upon me.

And I don't believe that there's any

2
3
4

THE COURT:

Let me see.

MR. GUYON:

So I don't think that's properly before

THE COURT:

Okay.

the Court.
Yeah, I do not see a certificate

5

of service attached to these documents.

6

file date of June 1 in my court's file.

7
8

MR. GUYON:

All I have is the

I'd be happy to move onto the Motion

for Summary Judgment if that's agreeable with the Court.

9

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

10

MR. GUYON:

Judge, you'll notice in our summary

11

judgment motion we have filed an order from the United States

12

Bankruptcy Court —

13

THE COURT:

I'm sorry, before we leave the issue of

14

service and your init:Lai Motion to Dismiss, you also had an

15

argument that was not terribly persuasive but I'm assuming

16

you've abandoned about subject matter jurisdiction.

17

MR. GUYON:

Right.

I think it probably would be

18

best to withdraw that because the United States Bankruptcy

19

Judge ' wouldn'b 1rule on the issue and —

20
21

THE COURT:

Well, she did more than not rule on it.

She did rule 1bhat she didn't have jurisdiction.

22

MR. GUYON:

23

So I'll withdraw that motion.

24
25

She took the position contrary to mine.

THE COURT: 'feah, which (inaudible), yeah.

Okay

cancels yours
4

1
2

MR. GUYON:

I have no problem withdrawing that,

withdrawing that motion —

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. GUYON:

- at the present time.

5

THE COURT:

It would have been denied anyway on

6

that basis but that's all right.

7

MR. GUYON:

8

up the Court's time just for —

9

THE COURT:

10
11
12

the

I understand and I don't want to take

I just want to make sure we've dotted

A

i's and crossed the A t's.
MR. GUYON:

Right.

Now, should I proceed on the

Motion for Summer Judgment?

13

THE COURT:

You may, I'm sorry.

14

MR. GUYON:

Now, the reason, the reason this was

15

brought and the reason it was done when it was done is that

16

we didn't know these facts until the Bankruptcy Court had

17

ruled on August 20 and you'll notice all my pleadings were

18

filed on August 21st.

19

had to bring this to the Court's attention that on the

20

merits, the complaint, there is no claim because Mr. Billings

21

agreed that there was no claim and that was decided by the

22

U.S. Bankruptcy Court and I have a certified copy of the

23

amended order if I could, if the Court would like that.

24

didn't have time to file a certified order with the motion,

25

but I have one.

So that was the first opportunity I

If I could approach I'd give it to the

I

1

Court.

Thank you.

2

THE COURT:

Have you premarked it?

3

MR. GUYON:

Pardon me?

4

THE COURT:

Have you premarked it?

5

MR. GUYON: Oh, I didn't mark it.

6

THE COURT:

And this includes the attachment of the

7

Settlement Agreement that Judge Boulden had attached to her -

8

in her draft order I thought she had indicated she was

9

incorporating by reference the agreement of the parties.

10

MR. GUYON:

Right.

11

THE COURT:

Yes, it's here.

12

MR. GUYON:

And the agreement itself as I have

13

pointed out in the Motion for Summary Judgment is very very

14

specific about the c'.Laims that - excuse me, I should have

15

marked this and I didn't - in my memorandum in support of

16

summary judgment I've drawn the Court's attention to a couple

17

of items of language from the —

18

THE COURT:

What page are you at?

19

MR. GUYON:

— that are pertinent to this motion

20

One is that MJr. Bill.Lngs —

21

THE COURT: I'm sorry. What page are you on?

22

MR. GUYON:

23

I'm on Page 2 of my memorandum in

support: of defendantrs motion for summary judgment.

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MR. GUYON:

At Paragraph 3, that is that Mr.
6

1

Billings, pro se, was clearly a party to that agreement and

2

"that the parties release each other against the others and

3

any and all claims and causes of action extend among them"

4

and this specifically says "including claims and causes of

5

action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against

6

the debtor and debtor's counsel."

7

paragraph.

8

And that's the second

And I'd also point out to the Court that right

9

under that, "for good and valuable consideration, (inaudible)

10

sufficiency which are acknowledged, including the exchange of

11

mutual releases and all claims and causes of action including

12

claims and causes of action for malicious prosecution and

13

abuse of process against the debtor and debtor's counsel."

14

And then the agreement says as I pointed out on

15

Page 2, "This agreement is subject to approval by the United

16

States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah" and then

17

the last paragraph on that page clearly states, "effective

18

upon the performance of the obligations in Paragraphs 2 and 3

19

above, the parties hereby mutually release each other."

20

won't read all of that but down near the middle it says

21

"including any action, (cough) excuse me, for abuse of

22

process or malicious prosecution."

23

to the Court that the complaint on file here is styled as one

24

against Mr. Toscano and his corporation for abuse of process.

25

I

And I'd simply point out

So my argument is that those claims and causes of

1

action that Mr. Billings asserts in the complaint in this

2

case were clearly and unequivocally given away, resolved,

3

settled by him in the Bankruptcy Court and the Bankruptcy

4

Court confirmed that which is evidenced by the certified

5

order that I've given you.

6

judicata.

7

question that Mr. Billings bargained away, whatever claims he

8

may have had and that boat sailed, those claims are no longer

9

and for that reason, he does not have a right to assert them

So, this is not a question of res

It's not a question of collateral estoppel, it's a

10

in this case and that's why we're asking for summary

11

judgment.

12

Does the Court have any questions of me?

13

THE COURT: No.

14

MR. GUYON: Thank you.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BILLINGS:

Mr. Billings.
Thank you, Your Honor.

I guess with

17

respect to the jurisdiction issues, it seems to me that even

18

putting aside the constable's affidavit, that the appearance

19

and the motions brought by counsel today pretty much make all

20

that moot.

21

so therefore, that question is decided.

22

seen the affidavit other than an email copy.

23

no obligation to serve it to him.

24

document.

25

properly notes, it's entitled to a presumption of

In other words, he submitted to the jurisdiction,
I've actually never
So I was under

I never even had the

It's evidence that he was served and as the Court

So I don't think there's any question in th e

1

correctness.

2

first place that Mr. Toscano was properly served.

3

But in any case, even despite the overwhelming

4

evidence that he was properly served, here he is and now

5

they're moving the Court for affirmative relief.

6

positions are absolutely inconsistent.

7

is obliged at this point to simply acknowledge that there 's

8

proper service and the Court has personal jurisdiction over

9

the defendant.

So the two

So I think the Court

As far as the summary judgment motion goes, if the

10
11

Court is at all inclined to even consider that motion or to

12

grant that motion now, I would request a continuance —

13

THE COURT:

Why?

14

MR. BILLINGS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BILLINGS:

17

THE COURT:

Well, it seems -

You've taken the time to respond —
Yes, yes.

You've had the opportunity to respond.

18

So I'm not seeing how you would be - how your - the basis> for

19

why you would need a continuance.

20

MR. BILLINGS:

The basis would be so I could c]_ean

21

it up.

I mean, I've had almost no notice of this, email

22

notice and it wasn't even properly served.

23

willing to go ahead and proceed here and make certain

24

arguments but what I haven't had an opportunity to do is get

25

certified records that would further support my position.

I mean, I'm

In
9

1

other words, to make my position completely controlling it

2

seems to me, a certified transcript of the Court's proceeding

3

in the Bankruptcy Court would pretty much decide it.

4

THE COURT:

Well, the proceedings are irrelevant

5

with - I mean, the order, the signed order by the court is

6

what controls, not what may have been said in the

7

proceedings.

8

final expression of judgment and order.

9

It's the order that the court adopts as its

MR. BILLINGS:

That's why this is clearly a case of

10

either - I mean, I think defense counsel misunderstands the

11

issues here.

12

defendant's position, then it clearly is a case of either it

13

has to be either a case of res judicata or collateral

14

estoppel.

15

of nowhere and it is offered to the court as a judgment.

16

Settlement Agreement, in order for that Settlement Agreement

17

to - well, let's put it this way then, if the Court is taking

18

the position that the —

19

If that's the Court's position, if that

You don't just have an agreement that appears out

THE COURT:

A

Why isn't an order adopted pursuant to

20

a Settlement Agreement, negotiated by the parties and adopted

21

as an order of the Court, not - which it clearly has been

22

here by Judge Boulden, why is that not an adjudication on the

23

merits that is conclusive?

24
25

MR. BILLINGS:
here.

Now, there's a lot of confusion

You've got two things going here that are confused.
10

1

If you'rej going to proceed as if the order in the Bankruptcy

2

Court is irre.Levant —
THE COURT:

3
4

Not, they're not saying it's

irrelevant.

5

MR. BILLINGS:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BILLINGS:

8

You did.

They're submitting to it.
You did.

If you said the Bankruptcy

Court —
THE COURT:

9

No, no, what I said is the discussion

10

of what may h<ave been said as part of a transcript is not the

11

ultimate determinant of what this Court gives weight to.

12

What this5 COU rt gives weight to is what the judgment of the

13

other court is as reflected in a judgment and order signed by

14

the judge.

15

MR. BILLINGS:

16

THE COURT:

In that case -

That's what is binding on this Court,

17

not what may 1have been said that would require a transcript

18

to be submitt ed to this Court.

19

to - not that the proceedings were irrelevant, that whatever

20

discussions may have occurred in the course of whatever

21

hearing, if any, was held before Judge Boulden, is not

22

controlling.

23

That was what I was intending

It's the order that's controlling.

MR. BILLINGS:

All right.

Well, it does look to me

24

that you' re 1 ooking at this then as a matter of res judicata.

25

In order for that judgment, settlement to have a res judicata
11

1

affect in this Court, it's extremely important what the Court

2

did there.

3

affect, it has to be a judgment on the same cause of action

4

against the same parties as in this case.

5

In other words, for it to have res judicata

THE COURT:

Not all.

Clearly —

It must include the parties

6

to this proceeding.

7

applies to the other parties in the other proceeding.

8
9
10
11

It does not have to mean that it also

MR. BILLINGS:
point.

I'm not sure I understand that

What matters is —
THE COURT:

The issue here is I have you and I have

Mr. Toscano and Mr. Toscano's professional corporation.

12

MR. BILLINGS:

Right.

13

THE COURT: Okay.

All three individuals or

14

entities, okay, the two individuals and the entity were all

15

present and parties to the Settlement Agreement and to the

16

litigation in the federal court, in the Bankruptcy Court.

17

MR. BILLINGS:

I'm really not - nothing of this at

18

this point really turns on the parties.

What really matters

19

because the Courts actually have relaxed a little bit, it

20

seems to me, the requirement that it be the same parties.

21

mean it is true that the defendant, Toscano, was not a party

22

to those proceedings.

I

23

THE COURT:

But you -

24

MR. BILLINGS:

25

THE COURT: Yeah, you agreed to include actions in

But that's not the real issue.

12

1

the settlement that —

2
3

MR. BILLINGS:

We have to put that aside for a

moment.

4

THE COURT:

Why?

5

MR. BILLINGS: Because first we have to decide

6

whether we have a judgment that's entitled to res judicata

7

(inaudible).

8

be decided on the following basis, a judgment is not entitled

9

to res judicata effect unless it is a judgment on the merits

That's the first issue.

And that issue has to

10

of the same cause of actions brought in that court as the

11

same cause of action brought in this court and that's clearly

12

not the case.

13

of the merits of the abuse of process claims, named in Count

14

1 of the First Amended Complaint.

15

does not apply.

16

parties.

17

the Federal District Court on the merits of the abuse of

18

process claims brought in this court, (cough) excuse me, on

19

the first count of abuse of process.

We had absolutely no judgment on any question

So res judicata clearly

It doesn't turn on the presence of the

It turns on the fact that there was no judgment in

That's out, clearly.

20

Now, the only real question —

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BILLINGS: The only real question here and it's

Okay.

I'm not sure I'm -

23

not a real question either, is whether collateral estoppel

24

applies.

25

judicata, as you know.

Now collateral estoppel is different than res

13

1

THE COURT:

Should have or could have been.

2

MR. BILLINGS:

No, the issue there on collateral

3

estoppel would be is whether the court made any findings on

4

some other cause of action that somehow binded the parties on

5

an issue that some cause of action in this court depends

6

upon.

7

clearly did not happen.

8

it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

9

It was emphatic that it was not going to enjoin this action

10

and simply approved the debtor's disposition of her estate.

11

But the court clearly made absolutely no findings about any

12

issue that pertains to the First Amended Complaint - sorry,

13

to the First Count, Count 1 of Abuse of Process of the First

14

Amended Complaint.

15

apply.

That's how collateral estoppel works.

That also

In fact, the Court was emphatic that

So even collateral estoppel does not

There as no hearing on that issue.

16

Now, as far as - so it seems to me there's

17

absolutely not res judicata effect to that judgment.

18

collaterally estopped from proceeding in this court and just

19

as a simply matter of summary judgment, I have clearly stated

20

in affidavits before the court under penalty of perjury that

21

the document that Defendant Toscano and his counsel are

22

presenting to this Court, is an absolute fraud and I can

23

prove it.

24

this was just some sort of personality conflict with

25

defendants.

I'm not

I wouldn't have come here from Shanghai, China if

Defendant Toscano has abused process in an
14

1

extremely serious way.

2

the Federal Bankruptcy Court and so he became very reckless

3

in how he attempted to resolve it.

4

He got nervous about what he did in

I drafted the Settlement Agreement that was

5

ultimately patched together and changed by Defendant Toscano

6

when he presented it to the Bankruptcy Court and to this

7

Court and I'm telling the Court again and I'll swear under

8

penalty of perjury again, that Settlement Agreement is a

9

fraud.

I've never agreed - it's not true that I never agreed

10

but I certainly advised him in light of his breaches of

11

contract, in light of his unilateral changes that he made to

12

the agreement, that I was no longer willing to waive any

13

claims against him for anything.

14

So as a matter of summary judgment, the mere fact

15

that I've contradicted and controverted the only issue that

16

he's raising here, i.e. that he's entitled to some sort of

17

waiver of the claims, is clearly contradicted.

18

is precluded from granting any sort of summary judgment on

19

that issue.

20

document which counsel just submitted to the Court is a

21

fraud.

22
23
24
25

So the Court

To make it very clear, (sneeze) excuse me, the

THE COURT:

It is a document that was signed,

presumably signed by you.
MR. BILLINGS:

No, I didn't sign it.

That's should

be a clear sign, a very clear sign of what's going on here.
15

1

You'll never find my signature on any of those documents.

2

changed that document in very serious ways, very important

3

ways.

4

and now he's submitted it to you and he also submitted it in

5

the same form to the Bankruptcy Court.

6

can prove it.

7
8
9

It completely undermined the value of the settlement

THE COURT:

It's a fraud and I

Why are you here instead of before

Judge Boulden?
MR. BILLINGS:

Well, I was in front of Judge

10

Boulden as well but Judge Boulden - it's hard to figure out

11

exactly - if we want to get into the mind of the tribunal

12

it's a little bit difficult to say but —

13

He

THE COURT: Wait. It seems to me that as a first

14

matter, that's an issue - if you are asserting under penalty

15

of perjury that there's been a fraud upon the court -

16

MR. BILLINGS: Yes.

17

THE COURT: - then we start with a fraud upon Judge

18
19

Boulden's Court.
MR. BILLINGS:

We sure do and I can prove that and

20

that's part of one of my causes of action in the - I believe

21

it's my third cause of action - second cause of action of the

22

First Amended Complaint.

23

as I can tell, Judge Boulden wanted to simply wash her hands

24

of these abuse of process claims and what she really wanted

25

to do was just get the debtor's estate settled.

The fact of the matter is, as far

But we did
16

1

not - she did not take evidence on the issue of fraud.

2

did not take evidence on the issue and she refused any sort

3

of evidence on this issue, on the question of whether or not

4

the terms of conditions that Defendant Toscano included in

5

that Settlement Agreement were accurate.

6

cannot be res judicata.

7

that's the key here, I have never had a day in court —

8
9

THE COURT:

She

So that matter

In other words, I've never had -

Well, the document that I have in front

of me, a certified copy of the court's order and judgment

10

includes as an attachment that it incorporates by reference,

11

an agreement that while it doesn't carry your physical

12

signature, it carries a notation that indicates a signature.

13

MR. BILLINGS:

I refuted - I'm not sure what you're

14

referring to there.

15

issue is that issue was never decided in the - that's why

16

it's not collateral estoppel.

17
18

I haven't seen this document.

THE COURT:

The key

You and I may have some disagreements

on how you and I read that matter but —

19

MR. BILLINGS:

20

THE COURT:

May I approach?

You may.

Now, I don't know what the

21

original document carries.

22

notation that signifies that an original signature has been

23

secured at some point.

24
25

MR. BILLINGS:

All I know is that that is a

It never was.

Here's what was

secured at one point is that on January 28 I wrote an email
17

1

authorization to approval of a January 28th Settlement

2

Agreement.

3

Defendant Toscano's cut and pasted, fraudulently created

4

version of the agreement that I sent to him on January 28th

5

and agreed to be bound by according to those terms and

6

conditions.

7

He changed in very material ways, that Settlement Agreement

8

and then presented it to the court without my signature.

9

None of that was litigated in Federal Bankruptcy Court.

The agreement that you have before you is

That's why you don't see my signature on there.

10

And in any case, even it had been litigated there,

11

here's really a key, even if it had been litigated there for

12

purposes of summary judgment motion, any settlement that was

13

obtained pursuant to fraud, in other words, if you want to

14

disagree with me about the fact that this does not qualify as

15

collateral estoppel, you would still have to agree with me,

16

it seems to me, that the case law is very clear that any

17

settlement obtained through fraud is ineffective and that is

18

the allegation that I'm making here which would also defeat

19

summary judgment.

20

So not only does this case not satisfy res

21

judicata, not satisfy any of the requirements of collateral

22

estoppel, it also is based entirely upon a fraudulently

23

obtained Settlement Agreement that I never signed.

24

never had a day in court on this.

25

very serious offenses —

I've

Mr. Toscano has committed

18

1
2

THE COURT:
Boulden —

3
4

Have you filed an appeal of Judge

MR. BILLINGS:

I'm trying to - if necessary I'm

We just had the hearing the other day, the 20th.

going to.

5

THE COURT:

Ten days ago.

6

MR. BILLINGS:

Yes, so there's still time to

7

appeal.

I frankly don't even think it's necessary to appeal

8

and I'm trying to work this thing out, nobody is quite

9

reasonable over here on defense table.

If I can work this

10

out without the appeal, that would be great.

Frankly, I

11

don't think I even have to appeal it but just to be safe and

12

to be sure, perhaps I will.

13

be safe but as I say, even if I don't appeal, it wouldn't

14

matter because res judicata and collateral estoppel don't

15

apply even if it was a valid judgment.

16

whether it was a valid judgment in the court, the issue in

17

the Federal Bankruptcy Court, the issue here is whether it's

18

entitled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in

19

this court.

I am inclined to do it just to

The issue here isn't

That's the issue.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll hear from Mr. Guyon.

21

MR. GUYON:

Judge, all of these arguments that Mr.

22

Billings has brought before you today, were argued before the

23

Bankruptcy Court on August 20th.

24

fraud, all these allegations of "I didn't sign the

25

agreement," all of these allegations of every kind were

All these allegations of

19

1

brought up on August 20 and disposed of as the Court can see

2

in the form of this order that the judge signed and the judge

3

prepared, I might add.

4

Now, as we sit here today, I mean, this is really a

5

novel approach to things and Mr. Billings really is arguing

6

even if, even if the judge over in the Bankruptcy Court says,

7

rejected all my arguments of fraud on the court and fraud by

8

Mr. Toscano and fraud by everybody else and she didn't buy

9

those and she's going to enforce this agreement on me which I

10

entered into verbally in April of this year - and let me add

11

that.

12

April at which Mr. Billings and his brother attended and all

13

the parties to that agreement and they verbally agreed to

14

this, even though they hadn't signed it and even though they

15

had filed all kinds of objections or whatever it was they

16

filed and all that was taken into account by Judge Boulden on

17

August 20.

18

Mr. Billings gets to enter into an enforceable agreement in

19

the Bankruptcy Court and then come to this Court and say

20

well, that didn't mean anything because of some wild

21

allegations of fraud which he's already brought up there.

22

So anyway, so here we are today and —

23

THE COURT:

There was a hearing before the Bankruptcy Court in

So that's kind of a fate'acompli.

I don't think

So your representation to me is that

24

the arguments that Mr. Billings is making here today were

25

presented to Judge Boulden.
20

1

MR. GUYON:

Absolutely —

2

MR. BILLINGS:

3

take him under oath.

4

MR. GUYON:

5

MR. BILLINGS:

6

THE COURT:

I would appreciate it if you would

— they were.
Would the Court please swear -

I'm not going to swear an attorney who

7

is appearing here as an advocate.

8

that is not an approp riate position to put an attorney in as

9

a fact witness in the proceedings.

10
11
12

MR. BILLINGS:

I'm sorry, Mr. Billings,

He's offering evidence.

That's all

I'm saying —
THE COURT:

He is making a representation as an

13

officer of the court and I am accepting a representation of

14

an officer of the court.

15

MR. GUYON:

Well, the bottom line is I think for

16

our purposes, Judge, is that we've stated and showed the

17

Court that all these claims were agreed by Mr. Billings, that

18

they disappeared.

19

are no such claims, the claim that he's trying to bring in

20

this Court has disapp eared also, as a matter of law.

21

regardless of whether the Court uses the issue of res

22

judicata or collatera 1 estoppel, or summary judgment, Rule 56

23

requires Mr. Billings to, by sworn affidavit, create a

24

question of material fact, not just a question of fact but it

25

has to be a material fact and I'd simply point out to the

Th ere are no such claims and because there

So

21

1

Court that all of the material facts are uncontroverted and

2

that is that Mr. Billings was bound by the agreement and that

3

it was - became part of the order in the Bankruptcy Court and

4

the Bankruptcy Court confirmed that and it's binding against

5

him as a matter of law.

6

Does the Court have any other questions of me?

7

THE COURT:

No, I do not.

8

MR. GUYON:

Thank you.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10
11

MR. BILLINGS:

Your Honor, may I please respond to

that?

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BILLINGS:

14

All right -

Ahhh He made some very serious claims

there that are not true.

15

THE COURT:

Normally - I mean, this is their

16

motion, so normally they get the reply but I will give you,

17

given that you have come a long ways, I will give you the

18

opportunity to make a final rebuttal but keep it brief.

19

MR. BILLINGS:

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.

It

20

does seem to me that defendants don't understand the issue of

21

res judicata or collateral estoppel.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BILLINGS:

24

THE COURT:

25

And you do?
Yes.

Please inform me how you are so much

more —
22

1

MR. BILLINGS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BILLINGS:

4

the correct rule.

5

it in the books.

6
7

- better versed — well because I'm simply stating

The rule speaks for itself.

THE COURT:

You can check

I am well aware of what the rules

imply.

8
9

I'm just stating -

MR. BILLINGS:

It has to be an issue that was

actually litigated in the Federal Bankruptcy Court.

Now,

10

counsel's representation that this issue was actually

11

litigated in Federal Bankruptcy Court is absolutely false.

12
13
14
15
16

THE COURT:

That's not what I heard Mr. Guyon

saying.
MR. BILLINGS:

He said all these arguments were

brought before the Federal Bankruptcy Court.
THE COURT:

Were presented to the court and

17

considered by the court, whether they went through a whole

18

adjudicative process or not is not I don't think what was

19

represented by Mr. Guyon, but that it was presented to Judge

20

Boulden and she had the opportunity to consider that.

21

MR. BILLINGS:

This is exactly why I preface my

22

comments with it seems that counsel doesn't understand the

23

requirements of res judicata, because it wouldn't matter that

24

we just had a plethora of evidence, for example, it wouldn't

25

matter for purpose of res judicata.

What matters is whether
23

1

the court agreed to conduct a hearing on the issue and the

2

court did not do that.

3

whether or not this was a fraudulent document and so on.

4

That wasn't even discussed.

5

exhibits that demonstrated very clearly that - we premarked

6

exhibits that demonstrated very clearly that this document is

7

a fraud.

8

says she's not going to allow me to introduce, to lay a

9

foundation to introduce that evidence.

We didn't have a discussion on

I asked the court if - I marked

I lodged those documents with the clerk.

The judge

So there was

10

absolutely no hearing on that issue.

11

said, move on to the other issues of jurisdiction and

12

removal.

13

court would have had to have accepted those documents into

14

evidence and to rule upon them.

15

have made findings of fact and conclusions of law as to

16

whether or not this document is a fraud or not.

17

issue here is that I've never had a day in court to

18

demonstrate that this document is a fraud.

19

And then the court

In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the

The court would have had to

So the real

I should also mention, of course, that I have filed

20

a First Amended Complaint and even if the Court granted

21

summary judgment on the first count which it absolutely

22

should not, the rest of the complaint is still valid because

23

it has absolutely nothing to do with that agreement.

24
25

THE COURT:

Well, no, because according to the

Settlement Agreement that is before me that was again adopted
24

1

by Judge Boulden, the parties release all claims whether

2

known or unknown, you know, in any forum —
MR. BILLINGS :

3
4

future c laims.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BILLINGS

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BILLINGS

9

Not future claims, Your Honor, not

Counsel, that's —
No, it doesn't.
That's what this language says.
No, it doesn't.

word about future claims.

It doesn't say a

(Inaudible) all future claims?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BILLINGS : Well, I don't, and I didn't.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BILLINGS :

14

Well And it's not even in the fraudulent

document •
THE COURT:

15
16

I'll tell you, it happens all the time.

Well, I think I've heard what you need

to say unless there's something new that you wanted to —

17

MR. BILLINGS :

Just the final point is all of this

18

is obviously a controverted genuine issue as to material

19

facts.

20

on these issues, no res judicata, no collateral estoppel and

21

clearly these facts have been controverted by my affidavit.

The Court is p>recluded from granting summary judgment

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BILLINGS>:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BILLINGS>:

Where is your written affidavit?
I filed it with the Court.

I haven't seen it.
Well, I filed it with the Court and
25

1

I also provided - I also provided —

2

THE COURT:

I received your memorandum, I have

3

received something that you've labeled a Separate Statement

4

of Disputed Facts, I'm not sure why I would consider a

5

Separate Statement of Disputed Facts that is not part of your

6

memorandum.

7

but even there, there is no affidavit.

8
9

This is not an authorized filing under Rule 7,

MR. BILLINGS:
approach?

Yes.

On August 27th, if I could

I filed what's titled Opposition to Defendant's

10

Motion for Summary Judgment.

11

was given nothing but email notices, but it is an affidavit

12

signed by me —

13
14
15

THE COURT:

I did it very quickly because I

I do not - hold on a second.

I need to

check my docket because I do not see any such filing.
MR. BILLINGS:

I filed it with the court and I also

16

left a courtesy copy in your chambers of each of these

17

documents.

18

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and then it shows

19

Declaration of Joseph Billings —

The title of the document is Opposition to

20

THE COURT:

I don't see an affidavit.

21

COURT CLERK: (Inaudible).

22

MR. BILLINGS:

I see -

It is an affidavit, the Opposition

23

is an affidavit and it was filed August 27th and even the

24

Separate Statement because of lack of time, is styled and

25

presented as an affidavit under penalty of perjury and signed
26

1

under penalty of perjury.

2

that we should make sure the Court has.

3
4

THE COURT:

Okay.

I do not know what you are

referring to.

5
6

There's actually four documents

MR. BILLINGS:

May I approach?

I can show you,

Your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

The document entitled Memorandum of

8

Points and Authority in Support of Opposition to Defendant's

9

Motions for Summary judgment.

10

referring to?

11
12

MR. BILLINGS:

THE COURT:

14

MR. BILLINGS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BILLINGS:

18

No, Your Honor, that's filed August

31st.

13

17

Is that the document you're

documents.

Yes.
And a courtesy copy too.

That's all I have seen.
No, there's three other important

It sounds like you have one of them.
THE COURT:

I have a Separate Statement of Disputed

19

Facts which as I say there's a procedural problem with how

20

this has been filed —

21

MR. BILLINGS:

Well, (inaudible) to that, I was

22

just putting these things together as quickly as possible in

23

light of the fact that we were given basically ex parte

24

notice of a summary judgment motion but I would also point

25

out that the Separate Statement is presented also as a
27

1

declaration and as an affidavit under penalty of perjury and

2

it's exhaustive in controverting the issues.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BILLINGS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BILLINGS:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BILLINGS:

9

THE COURT:

10

Except that there is no recognized —
Affidavit.

I don't see Yes.

Where?
You'll see in the first -

I see an -

MR. BILLINGS:

You'll see a footnote which refers

11

to - that I'm also treating it as an declaration and then

12

you'll also see at the back page —

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BILLINGS:

15

I do not see a signature here.
Sure, there's a signature on the

last page —
y

S'.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BILLINGS:

18

THE COURT:

19

COURT CLERK: Judge, we're talking about six

20

different things, (inaudible) because they don't want

21

courtesy copies (inaudible) so in case somebody ends up - I

22

docketed some r she's docketed some. They're not marked

23

courtesy copies so we're marking them all as originals and

24

it's getting <confusing.

25

MR. BILLINGS:

There is no signature. There is an
That's the courtesy copy.

It's not marked courtesy copy.

The originals are all filed with the
28

1

clerk's office and signed.

2
3
4

THE COURT:

Well, I don't have those in front of

me.
MR. BILLINGS:

All of the originals have been

5

signed and apparently you don't even have any sort of copy of

6

the document that I first filed immediately, my affidavit

7

opposing this motion which is itself sufficient to preclude

8

summary judgment which was filed on August 27, 2009.

9

approach to show you that?

10
11
12
13

THE COURT:

Can I

Do you have that and does that show on

the docket?
CLERK:

(Inaudible).

We got a bunch of stuff

yesterday afternoon —

14

MR. BILLINGS:

15

CLERK:

This was August 27th -

— (inaudible).

And I do have a bunch of

16

stuff that we got yesterday and it looks like we docketed

17

this morning.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BILLINGS:

20

THE COURT:

21

COURT CLERK: What is that titled?

22

THE COURT:

23

Yeah.

The only thing I'm seeing is -

I'll be happy to sign this one.

What?

This is titled Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

24

COURT CLERK:

25

THE COURT:

We have two copies of that.
We do?

Okay.

You may take that back.
29

MR. BILLINGS:

1
2

Thank you.

Did you get a copy of

the First Amended Complaint?

3

COURT CLERK:

4

THE COURT:

We have two copies of that as well.
Okay.

I don't need duplicate copies of

I ;just need one copy unless it's specifically

5

anything.

6

marked courtesy copy, I do not want to see it.
MR. BILLINGS:

7
8

her, should I mark it courtesy copy and —
THE COURT:

9

Okay -

MR. BILLINGS:

10
11

I gave it to the clerk and I asked

— and she said it doesn't matter,

it's stamped.
THE COURT:

12

No, it matters.

I don't - I don't

13

accept - cour-tesy copies, I will accept only in advance if

14

they come in substantially in advance of oral argument

15

because they' re worthless to me when they're filed on the

16

morning of th a argument.

17

MR. BILLINGS:

18

THE COURT:

19

There's just no opportunity for me to

review them.
MR. BILLINGS:

20
21

I understand, but -

This is one of the strategies in

setting this thing with less than five days notice.
THE COURT:

22

But, all right.

Well, the matter is

23

submitted.

I will, because it's clear that I don't have all

24

the documenta tion in front of me, I will take it under

25

advisement, review the paperwork and I will inform the
30

1

parties of my decision.

2

MR. BILLINGS:

I have one question, would you

3

entertain - the memorandum of points of authority I had to do

4

very quickly and there seems to be some question here of

5

exactly how does res judicata and collateral estoppel come

6

down, would the Court permit some additional

7 I

THE COURT:

No.

The motion has been - I don't want

to create further supplementation because if I let you
9 I supplement then I need to give Mr. Guyon the opportunity to
10

supplement.

I am perfectly capable of distinguishing res

11

adjudicata and collateral estoppel and applying it to the

12

facts.

I understand your argument, I will consider it.

13

MR. BILLINGS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

14

MR. GUYON:

15 J

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Thank you, Judge.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 |
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APPLICALBE RULES OF COVK ( ON APPEAL
1.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (c)(3)(A):

A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of
material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials,
such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
controverted by the responding party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Section 7 (c)(3)(A).

2.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 s

(a)

For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim

or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.

(b)

For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is

asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.

(c)

Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in

accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue
as to the amount of damages.

48

(d)

Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not

rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.

(e)

Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.

(f)

When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party

opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the partyfs opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
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(g)

Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule

are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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APPLICALBE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON APPEAL

1.

U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2.

Utah State Constitution Article I, Declaration of Rights
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
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